In this work, we propose and develop a new discrete-event based actuator attack model on the closed-loop system formed by the plant and the supervisor. We assume the actuator attacker partially observes the execution of the closed-loop system and eavesdrops the control commands issued by the supervisor. The attacker can modify each control command on a specified subset of attackable events. The attack principle of the actuator attacker is to remain covert until it can establish a successful attack and lead the attacked closed-loop system into generating certain damaging strings. We present a characterization for the existence of a successful attacker, via a new notion of attackability, and prove the existence of the supremal successful actuator attacker, when both the supervisor and the attacker are normal (that is, unobservable events to the supervisor cannot be disabled by the supervisor and unobservable events to the attacker cannot be attacked by the attacker). Finally, we present an algorithm to synthesize the supremal successful attackers that are represented by Moore automata.
2
L. Lin, S.B. Thuijsman, Y. Zhu, S. Ware, R. Su, M.A. Reniers the prevalence of cyber-physical systems in modern society and the catastrophic consequences that could occur after these systems get attacked [8] , [9] , it is important to design resilient control mechanisms against adversarial attacks; the first step towards this goal is to understand when adversarial attacks can succeed.
In this work, we focus on discrete-event systems as our model of cyber-physical systems and consider those adversaries that use actuator attacks. Most of the existing works in the discrete-event framework consider the problem of deception attack instead [2] , [3] , [6] , where the attacker would accomplish the attack goal by altering the sensor readings. The work that is most closely related to ours is [1] , in which the authors present an actuator enablement attack scenario. For actuator enablement attack (AE attack), the attacker's goal is to drive the plant into an unsafe state by overwriting the supervisor's disablement actions on some attackable events with enablement actions. Our work is mainly inspired by [1] ; here we present some interesting generalizations and enhancements over the setup presented in [1] , which allows us to model a more powerful actuator attacker and consider a richer set of defense strategies. The main contributions of this work are as follows:
1. We present a formal formulation of the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism), attacker, attacked closed-loop system and the attack goal. Compared with [1] , the attacker is not restricted to having the same observation scope as the supervisor. Furthermore, the attacker eavesdrops the control commands issued by the supervisor, which could be used to refine the knowledge of the attacker about the string generated by the plant. The actuator attack mechanism does not have to be AE attacks. The attacker may need to disable some enabled attackable events to fulfill the attack goal; indeed, in many cases, this is the only way to accomplish the attack goal due to partial observation by the attacker. 2. We then present a characterization for the existence of a successful attacker against a normal supervisor, under a normality assumption that all the attackable events are observable to the attacker; a notion of attackability plays an important role in the characterization. After that, we prove the existence of the supremal successful attacker and then present a characterization of it. 3. We also provide an algorithm for the synthesis of the supremal successful attackers that are represented by Moore automata.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the preliminaries. Then, in Section 3, we shall provide a detailed explanation about the system setup, including the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism), attacker, attacked closedloop system and the attack goal. In Section 4, we present the characterization results, together with a synthesis algorithm for synthesizing the supremal successful attackers on normal supervisors, under the assumption that attackable events are observable to the attackers. Finally, discussions and conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of supervisory control theory [10] , [11] and automata theory [12] . In this section, we shall recall the basic notions and terminology that are necessary to understand this work.
Synthesis of Successful Actuator Attackers on Supervisors 3 A finite state automaton is a 4-tuple G = (Q, Σ , δ , q 0 ), where Q is the finite set of states, Σ the alphabet of events, δ : Q × Σ → Q the partial transition function 1 , q 0 ∈ Q the initial state. A control constraint over Σ is a tuple (Σ c , Σ o ) of sub-alphabets of Σ , where Σ o ⊆ Σ denotes the set of observable events and Σ c ⊆ Σ the set of controllable events. Let Σ uo := Σ − Σ o denote the set of unobservable events and Σ uc := Σ − Σ c the set of uncontrollable events. For each sub-alphabet Σ ⊆ Σ , the natural projection P : Σ * → Σ * is defined and naturally extended to a mapping between languages [10] . Let L(G) = {s ∈ Σ * | δ (q 0 , s)!} denote the closed-behavior of G. A supervisor on G w.r.t. control constraint (Σ c , Σ o ) is a map V : P o (L(G)) → Γ , where P o : Σ * → Σ * o is the natural projection and Γ := {γ ⊆ Σ | Σ uc ⊆ γ}. V (w) is the control command issued by the supervisor after observing w ∈ P o (L(G)). V /G denotes the closed-loop system of G under the supervision of V . The closed-behavior L(V /G) of V /G is inductively defined as follows:
1. ε ∈ L(V /G), 2. if s ∈ L(V /G), σ ∈ V (P o (s)) and sσ ∈ L(G), then sσ ∈ L(V /G), 3. no other strings belong to L(V /G).
For any two strings s,t ∈ Σ * , we write s ≤ t (respectively, s < t) to denote that s is a prefix (respectively, strict prefix) of t. For any language L ⊆ Σ * , L is used to denote the prefix-closure of L. For two finite state automata G 1 , G 2 , we write G 1 G 2 to denote their synchronous product. For any string s, we write |s| to denote the length of s. For convenience, we often identify a singleton with the unique element it contains.
System Setup
In this section, we shall introduce the system setup that will be followed in this work. Intuitive explanations about the attack architecture and assumptions are provided in Section 3.1. After that, a formal setup is provided in Section 3.2, which includes a formalization of the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism), attacker, attacked closed-loop system and the attack goal.
Basic Ideas
Let us consider the architecture for actuator attack that is shown in Fig. 1 . The plant G, which is a finite state automaton over Σ , is under the control of a (partially observing) supervisor V w.r.t. (Σ c , Σ o ), which is also given by a finite state automaton over Σ . In addition, we assume the existence of an actuator attacker A that is able to modify the control command γ issued by the supervisor on a designated set of attackable events Σ c,A ⊆ Σ c , each time when it intercepts a control command 2 . The plant G follows the 4 L. Lin, S.B. Thuijsman, Y. Zhu, S. Ware, R. Su, M.A. Reniers modified control command γ instead of γ. We assume the supervisor is augmented with a monitoring mechanism that monitors the execution of the closed-loop system (under attack) 3 . If σ ∈ Σ c,A is enabled by the supervisor in γ, then the attacker is not discovered 4 by the supervisor when it disables σ in γ ; on the other hand, if σ ∈ Σ c,A is disabled in γ, then the decision of enabling σ in γ would place the attacker in the risk of being discovered immediately by the supervisor if σ can be fired 5 , unless σ is unobservable to the supervisor. We assume that the attacker has a complete knowledge about the models of the plant G and the supervisor V (and its realization S using a finite state automaton), including the control constraint (Σ c , Σ o ) over Σ . The attacker A partially observes the execution of the closed-loop system and (at the same time) eavesdrops the sequence of control commands issued by the supervisor. We assume that the set Σ o,A of events observable to the attacker is a subset of the set Σ o of events observable to the supervisor. In other words, we assume that the attacker cannot deploy additional sensors than those that are available to the supervisor. Thus, the supervisor may have a better knowledge about the execution of the closed-loop system than the attacker does. The sequence of control commands (issued by the supervisor) encodes to a certain extent the supervisor's knowledge on the execution of the closed-loop system, which could be used by the attacker to better estimate the string generated by the plant and determine whether it shall establish an attack on some attackable events. We assume that each time when the supervisor observes an event (and makes a state transition), it issues a new control command that can be intercepted by the attacker. By observing a control command from the supervisor, the attacker concludes that an observable event σ of the supervisor has occurred even if σ may be unobservable to the attacker.
The goal of the attacker is to drive the attacked closed-loop system into executing certain damaging strings outside the controlled behavior. The supervisor has a mechanism for halting the execution of the closed-loop system after discovering an actuator attack. Thus, in order to attack the closed-loop system successfully, the attacker must remain covert 6 [2] and enable some disabled (attackable) events only when either 1) the attack will not be discovered by the supervisor, i.e., the attacker remains covert, or 2) if the attack is discovered by the supervisor, then a damaging string has been generated. In particular, if σ ∈ Σ c,A is disabled by the supervisor in γ, then enabling σ in γ will not place the attacker in the risk of being discovered by the supervisor if 1) σ is unobservable to the supervisor, or 2) if σ is not enabled by the plant and thus cannot be fired.
Formal Setup
In this section, we explain the formal setup that is used in this work. In Section 3.2.1, we provide a formal definition of a supervisor, which is augmented with a monitoring mechanism that will halt the execution of the (attacked) closed-loop system once an actuator attack is discovered. In Section 3.2.2, we consider an actuator attacker that is able to partially observe the execution of the closed-loop system and (at the same time) eavesdrop the control commands issued by the supervisor. In Section 3.2.3, we then introduce the notion of a damage-inflicting set and explain the attacked closedloop system formed by the plant, supervisor and actuator attacker. Then, we present a formulation of the goal of the actuator attacker.
Supervisor
We recall that a supervisor on G w.
and only those strings in P o (L(V /G)) can be observed by the supervisor in the normal execution of the closed-loop system, the standard definition of a supervisor requires that the supervisor shall also apply control for those strings w ∈ P o (L(G)) − P o (L(V /G)) that cannot be observed in the normal execution of the closed-loop system. From the point of view of the supervisor, it will conclude the existence of an (actuator) attacker and then halt the execution of the closed-loop system the first time when it observes some string w / ∈ P o (L(V /G)). Under this interpretation, the supervisor is augmented with a monitoring mechanism for the detection of actuator attack and does not control outside P o (L(V /G)); thus, the supervisor (augmented with a monitoring mechanism) is effectively 7 a map V : P o (L(V /G)) → Γ . 
Actuator Attacker
In this section, we shall present a formal definition of an actuator attacker. To that end, we need to model the partial observation capability of an attacker, taking into account of the fact that control commands issued by the supervisor can be eavesdropped.
We here note that an actuator attacker may be able to attack the closed-loop system only if the supervisor has not halted the execution (of the closed-loop system); suppose s is the string that is generated by the plant, then the attacker may be able to attack the closed-loop system only if P o (s) ∈ P o (L(V /G)) (see Section 3.2.1). It is important to understand the observation sequence for the attacker when s is generated, which is the only factor that determines the attack decision of the attacker. If the plant executes any event σ ∈ Σ uo that is unobservable to the supervisor, then the attacker will observe nothing since σ is unobservable to the attacker (no observation of execution from the plant) and σ is unobservable to the supervisor (no control command will be issued by the supervisor). Thus, the attacker's observation sequence solely depends on the supervisor's observation sequence P o (s) ∈ P o (L(V /G)). Now, we still need to define a functionP V o,A that maps supervisor's observation sequences to attacker's observation sequences. Let P o (s) = σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n denote the supervisor's observation sequence. We shall explain how it can be transformed into the attacker's observation sequence. If the supervisor observes the execution of event σ i ∈ Σ o , then the supervisor will issue a new control command V (σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ i ), since σ i is observable to the supervisor, which is then intercepted by the attacker. There are two subcases for σ i ∈ Σ o , regarding the attacker's observation on the execution of the plant. If σ i ∈ Σ o,A ⊆ Σ o , then the attacker will also observe execution of σ i from the plant. If σ i ∈ Σ o − Σ o,A , then the attacker will observe nothing (that is, ε) from the plant; however, based on the newly issued control command, it can infer that some event in Σ o − Σ o,A has already been fired. Thus, at each step, the attacker observes (P o,A (σ i ),V (σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ i )). Then, the attacker's observation sequence is simply a string in ((Σ o,A ∪ {ε}) × Γ ) * . From the above discussion, we obtain thatP 
The set of all the possible observation sequences 8 for the attacker isP V o,A (P o (L(V /G))). The attacker modifies the control command it intercepts based upon its observation. We shall call the tuple (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) an attack constraint over Σ . An attacker on
Here, ∆Γ denotes the set of all the possible attack decisions that can be made by the attacker on the set Σ c,A of attackable events. Intuitively, each ∆ γ ∈ ∆Γ denotes the set of enabled attackable events that are determined by the attacker. For any P o (s) ∈ P o (L(V /G)), the attacker determines the set ∆ γ = A(P V o,A (P o (s))) of attackable events to be enabled based on its observationP V o,A (P o (s)). We notice that the 8 The execution of the attacked closed-loop system will be halted once w / ∈ P o (L(V /G)) is observed by the supervisor, at which point the attacker will not (need to) record any further observation sequence.
Synthesis of Successful Actuator Attackers on Supervisors 7 set of attackable events enabled by the supervisor in γ is V (P o (s)) ∩ Σ c,A . Thus, the attacker applies actual attack iff V (P o (s)) ∩ Σ c,A = A(P V o,A (P o (s))).
Attacked Closed-loop System and Damage-Inflicting Set
Based on the above formal definitions of a supervisor and an actuator attacker, we are ready to define the attacked closed-loop system formed by the plant, supervisor and attacker. We already know that, after string s is generated in the plant with P o (s) ∈ P o (L(V /G)), the control command issued by the supervisor is γ = V (P o (s)) and the attack decision made by the actuator attacker is ∆ γ = A(P V o,A (P o (s))). Then, it follows that the modified control command is γ :
). Now, given the supervisor V and the actuator attacker A, we could lump them together into an equivalent (attacked) supervisor V A : P o (L(V /G)) → Γ such that, for any string w ∈ P o (L(V /G)) observed by the attacked supervisor, the control command issued by
). The plant G follows the control command issued by the attacked supervisor V A and the attacked closed-loop system is denoted by V A /G (the grouping of supervisor V and attacker A into V A is illustrated in Fig. 2 ). In the presence of an actuator attacker performing actuator attacks, the execution of the closed-loop system will be immediately halted once the supervisor detects an attack from the actuator attacker. Thus, the definition of the (attacked) closed-behavior L(V A /G) of V A /G is slightly different from that of L(V /G) (due to the existence of the monitoring mechanism) and is inductively defined as follows:
, the supervisor already halts the execution of the closed-loop system and thus sσ cannot be generated. The goal of the actuator attacker is to drive the attacked closed-loop system into executing certain damaging strings. Let L dmg ⊆ L(G) be some regular language over Σ that denotes a so-called "damage-inflicting set", where each string is a damaging string. We here shall require that L dmg ∩ L(V /G) = ∅, that is, no string in L(V /G) could be damaging. Then, we have that L dmg ⊆ L(G) − L(V /G). The goal of the actuator attacker is formulated as follows:
The first condition says that the actuator attacker can drive the system into executing certain damaging strings. It is a "possibilistic" statement in the sense that it is possible for a damaging string to be generated by the attacked closed-loop system. However, there is no guarantee that a damaging string will be generated in any single run of the attacked closed-loop system, due to potential uncontrollable factors that are beyond the capability of the attacker. The second condition says that once the attacked closedloop system runs outside
at which point the supervisor detects the actuator attack and halts the execution of the attacked closedloop system, a damaging string must have been generated 9 , i.e. some prefix of s is a damaging string. If the actuator attacker achieves its goal, then it is considered to be successful. Thus, we say an attacker A is successful on
It is of interest to consider the following two basic problems:
In the rest of this work, we shall present a solution to Problem 1 under the simplifying assumption of normality; Problem 2 will be left as future work. 
Attack Synthesis for Normal Supervisors
Then, we have that Σ uo ⊆ Σ uc , that is, unobservable events to the supervisor cannot be disabled by the supervisor. Thus, for any 9 That is, the attacker is only detected when it is too late.
Synthesis of Successful Actuator Attackers on Supervisors 9 constraint (Σ c , Σ o ) is realized by a finite state automaton S = (X, Σ , ζ , x 0 ) that satisfies the controllability and observability constraints 10 [13]:
1. (controllability) for any state x ∈ X and any uncontrollable event σ ∈ Σ uc , ζ (x, σ )!, 2. (observability) for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event
, the observability constraint is then reduced to: for any state x ∈ X and any unobservable event
In this section, we investigate the actuator attacker's attack strategy when the supervisors satisfy the normality property. Normal supervisors leave much reduced attack surfaces for the attacker, since events that are disabled must be observable to the supervisor and enabling those disabled (attackable) events (by the actuator attacker) may immediately break the covertness of the attacker, if they are also enabled by the plant. In other words, once the plant generates any string s / ∈ L(V /G), which is only possible after the attacker enables a disabled attackable event, the supervisor will immediately halt the execution of the closed-loop system. Based on this observation, we shall now show that, with the normality assumption imposed on the supervisors, the definition of L(V A /G) can be simplified.
for supervisors that satisfy the normality condition [10] .
Moreover, the goal of the attacker can also be simplified when V is assumed to be normal.
. It is clear that the right hand side (of the "iff" statement) implies the left hand side (of the "iff" statement). In the following, we only need to show that the left hand side implies the right hand side. Suppose the left hand side holds. That is, we have
Then, by 1), we know that there exists some string s
By the definition of L(V A /G) and Lemma 1, we know 11 
We make the following simplifying assumption throughout the rest of this work.
Remark 2 Intuitively, Assumption 1 states that the attacker cannot attack events that it cannot observe. With Assumption 1, we then have the following inclusion relations in the case of attacking normal supervisors.
Thus, in this work we consider the special case of normal supervisors and normal attackers. We shall now introduce the notion of an enabling actuator attacker, which plays an important role in solving the problem of synthesizing attackers in this setup (see Remark 2) .
For an enabling actuator attacker A, we have that
. Intuitively, it never disables attackable events that are enabled by the supervisor, that is, the only attack decision of an enabling attacker is to enable attackable events that are disabled by the supervisor. Essentially, an enabling actuator attacker only performs AE attacks [1] . It follows that, for any enabling actuator attacker A, we have L(V A /G) ⊇ L(V /G). We are now ready to state the following theorem; it states that, with the normality assumption imposed on the supervisors and attackers, we only need to focus on AE attacks in order to determine the existence of successful attackers.
Theorem 1 Let the plant G and the normal supervisor V be given. Then, the following three statements are equivalent. 
Proof. Clearly, 2) implies 1). We shall first show 1) implies 3).
, we conclude that 3. a) holds. In the following, we shall show that 3. b) also holds.
Let s be any string in
where last denotes the operation that computes the last element in a string, and by the defi-
We shall only need to show that s
, since s 1 σ ≤ s and σ ∈ Σ o,A . It follows that the set
is non-empty. Let s 0 1 be the longest string in D. Then,P V o,A (P o (s 0 1 )) =P V o,A (P o (s 1 )) is a strict prefix ofP V o,A (P o (s)) and it follows that s = s 0 1 . Since s 0 1 ≤ s by the definition of D, we must have s 0 1 < s. It follows that s = s 0 1 σ s 0 2 for some σ ∈ Σ and s 0 2 ∈ Σ * . We first observe that σ ∈ Σ o , since otherwise s 0 1 σ would be another string in D and it is longer than s 0 1 , which contradicts the fact that s 0 1 is the longest string in D. Next, we show that σ ∈ Σ o,A . Otherwise, we have σ ∈ Σ o − Σ o,A and the following. 
. That is, we must have σ ∈ Σ o,A . Moreover, we must have σ = σ ; otherwise, the same contradiction can be reached by comparingP
Then, we can conclude that σ / ∈ V A (P o (s 0 1 )). However, this contradicts with the fact that s 0 1 σ ∈ L(V A /G). Thus, we conclude that indeed s ∈ L(V A /G). It follows that 3. b) holds.
Finally, we shall show that 3) implies 2). Now, suppose 3) holds. Let s ∈ L(V /G) and σ ∈ Σ c,A such that 1) sσ ∈ L dmg , and 2) for any string
Intuitively, the attacker A performs no actual attack until it observesP V o,A (P o (s)), at which point the attacker enables the disabled attackable event σ . It is immediate that A is a well-defined actuator attacker, since for any
. It is clear that A is an enabling actuator attacker by definition. In the rest, we show that
Since A is an enabling attacker, we have L(V /G) ⊆ L(V A /G). Since s ∈ L(V /G) and σ ∈ A(P V o,A (P o (s))) ⊆ V A (P o (s)) and sσ ∈ L dmg ⊆ L(G), we have sσ ∈ L(V A /G) and sσ / ∈ L(V /G), i.e., sσ ∈ L(V A /G)−L(V /G). We conclude that L(V A /G)−L(V /G) = ∅. In the rest, we only need to show that L(V A /G) − L(V /G) ⊆ L dmg . Let s be any string in L(V A /G) − L(V /G). By the definition of L(V A /G) and Lemma 1, we conclude that s = s σ for some s ∈ L(V /G) and some σ ∈ Σ c,A , where we have σ / ∈ V (P o (s )) and σ ∈ A(P V o,A (P o (s ))) ⊆ V A (P o (s )). We then conclude that V (P o (s )) = V A (P o (s )) and also σ ∈ V A (P o (s ))−V (P o (s )). Now, from the definition of A, we observe that, for any
and s σ = s σ = s ∈ L(G), which implies s = s σ ∈ L dmg by the supposition. That is, we have shown that L(V A /G) − L(V /G) ⊆ L dmg . That is, 2) holds.
Based on Theorem 1, we are able to identify a notion of attackability and a notion of an attack pair for ensuring the existence of a successful (enabling) attacker, in the case of normal supervisors. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg can be obtained. We now make the following remark.
Remark 3 Given any two supervisors
V 1 ,V 2 on G w.r.t. (Σ c , Σ o ), (G,V 1 ) and (G,V 2 ) are said to be equi-attackable w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg if (G,V 1 ) is attackable w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg iff (G,V 2 ) is attackable w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg . It is worth noting that L(V 1 /G) = L(V 2 /G) does not imply the equi-attackability of (G,V 1 ) and (G,V 2 ), since in general V 1 = V 2 and thusP V 1 o,A =P V 2 o,A .
Characterization of the Supremal Successful Enabling Attacker
From now on, we shall mainly focus on the class of enabling attackers on (G,V ) w.r.t. 
On the other hand, let s 0 be any string in (s,σ )∈B En(s, σ ). By definition, there exists some (s, σ ) ∈ B such that s 0 ∈ En(s, σ ). We have sσ ∈ L(V A /G) − L(V /G) and . Intuitively, after the closed-loop system generates a string s ∈ L(V /G) ⊆ L(V A sup /G), the attacker A sup enables an attackable event 13 σ ∈ Σ c,A −V (P o (s)) iff there exists a string s ∈ L(V /G) that is observationally equivalent to s from the attacker's point of view, i.e.,P V o,A (P o (s)) =P V o,A (P o (s )), such that (s , σ ) is an attack pair. We first show that A sup is a well-defined attacker. That is, for any two strings s,
. 13 The attackable events in V (P o (s)) ∩ Σ c,A are always enabled by A sup since A sup is enabling. Proof. It is clear that L(V /G) ⊆ L(V A sup /G), since A sup is enabling. We need to show
Let s be any string in Let s ∈ (s,σ )∈AP dmg En(s, σ ). Then, there exists some (s, σ ) ∈ AP dmg such that s ∈ En(s, σ ) ⊆ L dmg . Then, we have that s = s σ for some
From Proposition 1 and Lemma 4, we know that A sup generates the largest possible attacked closed-behavior among the set of successful enabling attackers; for this reason, we refer to A sup as the supremal successful enabling attacker 14 . We now show that the attacked closed-behavior under A sup is the largest possible, even if we take into consideration those attackers that are not enabling. In other words, there is no loss of permissiveness when we focus on the class of enabling attackers. En(s, σ ) . It is clear that s = sσ ∈ L dmg for some s ∈ L(V /G) and some σ ∈ Σ c,A . From the proof of Theorem 1, we know that (s, σ ) is an attack pair. Then, it follows that s = sσ ∈ En(s, σ ) ⊆ (s,σ )∈AP dmg En(s, σ ).
Synthesis of the Supremal Successful Attacker
In this subsection, we shall address the problem of synthesis of the supremal successful attacker A sup under the normality assumption.
Recall that G = (Q, Σ , δ , q 0 ) is the plant, V is the supervisor on G w.r.t. (Σ c , Σ o ), which is given by the finite state automaton S = (X, Σ , ζ , x 0 ), and L dmg is the set of damaging strings, which is a regular language over Σ . Let L dmg be recognized by the finite damage automaton H = (Z, Σ , η, z 0 , Z m ), i.e., L m (H) = L dmg 15 . We require H to be complete, i.e., L(H) = Σ * . We shall now provide a high-level idea of the synthesis algorithm using G, S and H.
In order to synthesize the supremal successful attacker A sup on (G, S) w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg , which is given in Section 4.1, we need to know the attacker's observation sequenceP To compute the attacker's observation sequenceP V o,A (P o (s)), we need to annotate the supervisor's observation sequence P o (s) ∈ P o (L(S G)) with the sequence of control commands issued by the supervisor. Now, the basic idea is to first annotate all the string executions in P o (S) and then transfer the annotation to S G. With a dedicated product operation, one can obtain a transducer structure that maps string executions in L(S G) to attacker's observation sequences, that is, a finite state structure encoding theP V o,A • P o function. Since the attacker observes nothing when an unobservable event to the supervisor is executed, epsilon label can occur in the attacker's observation annotation 16 in the transducer structure forP V o,A • P o . We need to determinize the transducer structure with respect to the attacker's observation alphabet; it involves a subset construction w.r.t. the attacker's observation alphabet. After the determization operation, we can determine the set of all the strings in L(S G) that give rise to the same attacker's observation sequence. However, this is not yet sufficient. To determine whether the attacker can establish a successful attack, we need to incorporate H in the synchronization to obtain a refined transducer-like structure, before the determinization is carried out. The synchronization is performed up to those strings in L(S G) and those strings in L(G) that are one-step σ -extensions of strings in L(S G), for each σ ∈ Σ c,A .
The synthesis algorithm for the supremal successful attackers consists of the following three steps:
1. compute an annotated supervisor 2. compute the generalized synchronous product of the plant, annotated supervisor and the damage automaton 3. perform a subset construction on the generalized synchronous product w.r.t. the attacker's observation alphabet For example, let us consider the plant G shown in the left of Fig. 3 and the supervisor S shown in the right of Fig. 3 .
The colored state, i.e., the state 4, in the plant is the unique bad state to avoid. It is not difficult to verify that S is indeed a supervisor on G w.r.t. (Σ c , Σ o ) and the state avoidance property has been enforced, that is, in the synchronous product of G and S , every state (q, x) ∈ Q × X, where q is the state 4, can never be reached. We shall illustrate the three steps of the synthesis algorithm using this example of G and S in the rest of this section. 
Annotation of the Supervisor
Given the supervisor S = (X, Σ , ζ , x 0 ), we produce the annotated supervisor
where ζ A : X ×(Σ o ×Γ ∪Σ uo ) −→ X is the partial transition function, which is defined as follows:
That is, we annotate each observable transition (x, σ , x ) in ζ with the control command γ issued by the supervisor at state x ; that is, (x, σ , x ) is replaced by (x, (σ , γ), x ) in ζ A . Thus, if we project out the unobservable events in Σ uo , each string in S A will be of the form (σ 1 ,
Thus, if we project out the unobservable events in Σ uo , each string in S A is of the form
where σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n is the supervisor's observation sequence. It is then straightforward to record all the attacker's observation sequences
in S A afterwards, which will be delayed until the annotation in P o (S A ) is transferred to S G via a dedicated synchronous product operation. For example, the annotated supervisor S A of S in Fig. 3 is shown in Fig. 4 . If the plant generates s = ba c, then P o (s) = a c is the supervisor's observation sequence. It is clear that the attacker's observation sequence is (ε, {b, c})(c, {b, a}) . However, we only record the sequence b(a , {b, c})(c, {b, a}) in S A or, equivalently, we record the sequence (a , {b, c})(c, {b, a}) in P(S A ).
Fig. 4: The annotated supervisor S A
We need to transfer the annotation in P(S A ) to S G to obtain a transducer structure that maps string executions in L(S G) to attacker's observation sequences. This is not that difficult as we only need to synchronize the plant G and the annotated supervisor S A using a dedicated synchronous product operation, which transfers the attacker's observation annotation, which then encodes the functionP V o,A •P o : L(S G) → ((Σ o,A ∪ {ε}) × Γ ) * . Based on the product of G and S A , we can compute every set of strings in L(S G) that can be mapped to the same attacker's observation sequence, via a subset construction w.r.t. the attacker's observation alphabet. To determine whether an attack shall be established for an attacker's observation sequence, we need to synchronize G and S A with H before the determinization is performed. The overall product operation will be referred to as the generalized synchronous product operation, which is explained in detail in the next subsection.
Generalized Synchronous Product
Given the plant G = (Q, Σ , δ , q 0 ), the annotated supervisor S A = (X, Σ o ×Γ ∪Σ uo , ζ A , x 0 ) and the damage automaton H = (Z, Σ , η, z 0 , Z m ), the generalized synchronous product GP(G, S A , H) of G, S A and H is given by
where ⊥, are two new states that are different from the states in Q × X × Z,
is defined as follows:
The definition of GP(G, S A , H) looks complicated. We shall analyze each item carefully. The state space is Q × X × Z ∪ {⊥, }. Intuitively, the state ⊥ indicates a failed attack, while the state indicates a successful attack. The alphabet Σ GP is the union of 
is executed by the plant. If σ ∈ Σ uo is executed by the plant, then the attacker observes nothing and we use the l = ε label for the annotation. By the items 1)-3) of the definition of δ GP , we can observe that every string s ∈ L(S G) is the projection of some string of L(GP(G, S A , H)) onto the first component. Moreover, for any string of the form s = (σ 1 , l 1 )(σ 2 , l 2 ) . . . (σ n , l n ) in L(GP(G, S A , H)), we have that l 1 l 2 . . . l n =P V o,A (P o (σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n )). That is, the items 1)-3) of the definition of δ GP ensures that part of GP(G, S A , H) encodes the transducer structure that maps string executions in L(S G) to attacker's observation sequences. By the items 4)-5) of the definition of δ GP , we observe that, when projected onto the first component, L(GP(G, S A , H)) can generate strings in L(G) − L(S G), but these strings can only be some one-step σ -extensions of strings in L(S G) for σ ∈ Σ c,A ; in particular, these strings occur precisely because of the actuator attack on attackable events. After the actuator attack, the closed-loop system will be halted and thus we will not need to record the attacker's observation any more. It is for this reason that Σ c,A is included in Σ GP . GP(G, S A , H) transduces strings in L(S G) and, when projected onto the first component, record the strings in L(S G)Σ c,A ∩L(G)−L(S G). Thus, for each string s of the form (σ 1 , l 1 )(σ 2 , l 2 ) . . . (σ n , l n )σ n+1 generated by GP(G,
For example, consider the damage automaton H shown in Fig. 5 , where we have omitted the dump state, i.e., state 6, and the corresponding transitions. The general- The generalized synchronous product GP(G, S A , H) is a transducer-like structure that maps string executions in L(S G) to attacker's observation sequences; furthermore, it records in all the cases when an actuator attack occurs and also determines whether it will succeed. To determine whether a successful actuator attack can be established, we need to determine each set 17 of string executions in L(S G) that are mapped to the same attackers' observation sequence. This is what will be carried out in this subsection, which involves a subset construction w.r.t. the attacker's observation alphabet.
Subset Construction w.r.t. the Attacker's Observation Alphabet:
Given GP(G, S A , H), we shall now perform subset construction on GP(G, S A , H) with respect to the attacker's observation alphabet.
Let GPS(G, S A , H) denote the sub-automaton of GP(G, S A , H) with state space restricted to Q × X × Z. The alphabet of GPS(G,
Let GPS 1 (G, S A , H) (respectively, GPS 2 (G, S A , H)) denote the automaton that is obtained from GPS(G, S A , H) by removing 18 the second component l (respectively, first component σ ) from the event (σ , l) for each transition. Let SUB(GPS 2 (G, S A , H)) denote the automaton that is obtained from GPS 2 (G, S A , H) by subset construction [12] .
is a labeling function defined as follows: for any y ∈ Y and any σ ∈ Σ c,A , σ ∈ L f (y) iff there exists some v ∈ y such that,
Intuitively, SUB(GP(G, S A , H)) is a Moore automaton that maps each attacker's observation sequence to the subset of attackable events that are attacked 19 by A sup . In particular, after the attacker observes the sequence l 1 l 2 . . . l n ∈ ((Σ o,A ∪ {ε}) × Γ ) * = (Σ SUB ) * , the subset of attackable events that are attacked by A sup is L f (∆ SUB (y 0 , l 1 l 2 . . . l n )). If L f (∆ SUB (y 0 , l 1 l 2 . . . l n )) = ∅, then the attacker cannot establish an attack after observing l 1 l 2 . . . l n . If this holds for all the possible attacker's observation sequences inP V o,A (P o (L(S G))), then we conclude that (G, S) is not attackable w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg .
Proof of Correctness
In this subsection, we shall show that the supremal successful attacker A sup :P V o,A (P o (L(S G))) → ∆Γ is realized 20 by the Moore automaton SUB(GP (G, S A , H) 
and L dmg , then we can also directly read this information off SUB(GP(G, S A , H)). The next lemma shows that the domain of A sup is indeed captured by SUB(GP(G, S A , H)). The closed-behavior L(SUB(GP(G, S A , H))) of the Moore automaton SUB(GP(G, S A , H)) = (SUB(GPS 2 (G, S A , H) ), L f ) is defined to be L(SUB(GPS 2 (G, S A , H))) 21 .
Lemma 5 L(SUB(GP(G, S A , H))) =P V o,A (P o (L(S G))).
Proof. It is clear that L(SUB(GPS 2 (G, S A , H))) = L(GPS 2 (G, S A , H)) 22 , since subset construction preserves the closed-behavior of an ε-NFA. Recall that GPS 2 (G, S A , H) denotes the ε-NFA that is obtained from GPS(G, S A , H) by removing the first component σ from the event (σ , l) for each transition. By the construction of GPS(G, S A , H), L(GPS(G, S A , H)) consists of strings of the form s = (σ 1 , l 1 )(σ 2 , l 2 ) . . . (σ n , l n ), where l 1 l 2 . . . l n =P V o,A (P o (σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n )) and σ 1 σ 2 . . . σ n ∈ L(S G); moreover, every string s in L(S G) is the projection of some string in L(GPS(G, S A , H)) onto the first component, by the construction of GPS(G, S A , H). Thus, we have L(GPS 1 (G, S A , H)) = L(S G) and L(GPS 2 (G, S A , H)) =P V o,A (P o (L(S G))). Thus, L(SUB(GP(G, S A , H))) = P V o,A (P o (L(S G))). 
Then, by the construction of GPS 1 (G, S A , H) and SUB(GPS 2 (G, S A , H)), there exists some string s ∈ L(S G) such that show that σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s)))). It then follows that L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s)))) = ∅, where ∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s))) is a reachable state of SUB(GP(G, S A , H)). First of all, we have σ ∈ Σ c,A by the definition of an attack pair. It is clear that δ GPS1 ((q 0 , x 0 , z 0 ), s) ∈ ∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s))). We only need to show the following:
Then, it follows that σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s)))). The first item is straightforward from sσ ∈ L dmg . In the rest, we prove the second item.
Let v ∈ ∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s))). It follows that there exists some string s ∈ L(S G)
o,A (P o (s )) and s σ ∈ L(G). Thus, we can then conclude that s σ ∈ L dmg . That is, we
Based on Proposition 3, we immediately have the following theorem. Proof. Let σ ∈ I(P V o,A (P o (s))). Then, by the definition, there exists some s ∈ L(S G) such thatP V o,A (P o (s)) =P V o,A (P o (s )) and (s , σ ) ∈ AP dmg . From the proof of Proposition 3, we conclude that σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s )))) = L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s)))). Let σ ∈ L f (∆ SUB (y 0 ,P V o,A (P o (s)))). By the definition, σ ∈ Σ c,A and there exists some s ∈ L(S G) such that The first item says that s σ ∈ L dmg and the second item says that for any s ∈ L(S G) such thatP V o,A (P o (s )) =P V o,A (P o (s )), s σ ∈ L(G) implies s σ ∈ L dmg . Thus, we conclude that (s , σ ) is an attack pair w.r.t. (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg . Since s ∈ L(S G) and P V o,A (P o (s )) =P V o,A (P o (s)), we conclude that σ ∈ I(P V o,A (P o (s))).
For example, the Moore automaton SUB(GP(G , S A , H )) is shown in Fig. 7 for the G , S and H provided previously. In particular, we can conclude that (G , S ) is attackable with respect to (Σ c,A , Σ o,A ) and L dmg , since In this work, we have formulated the following two synthesis problems within discreteevent systems formalism.
1. the problem of synthesis of successful actuator attackers on supervisors. 2. the problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors against actuator attackers.
Moreover, we have resolved the problem of synthesis of successful actuator attackers on normal supervisors under the assumption Σ c,A ⊆ Σ o,A , i.e., a normality assumption on the attacker, in which case the supremal successful actuator attackers exist and can be synthesized based on the synthesis algorithm provided in Section 4.2.
This research work imposes some reasonable assumptions (see Remark 2) in order for the exposition to remain elementary. In the following, we shall briefly discuss about some future research directions that could be continued based on this work.
First of all, the supremal actuator attackers synthesized in this work are considered to be passive. They are passive since they would never disable attackable events that are enabled by the supervisors (i.e., they are enabling). A passive attacker never alters the execution of the closed-loop system within L(V /G), and it only patiently waits for its chance in order to establish a successful attack; on the other hand, an active attacker will influence the execution of the closed-loop system within L(V /G), by properly disabling attackable events that are enabled by the supervisors, so that there is a higher chance for it to establish a successful attack in any single run. From this point of view, the attack goal 1. L(V A /G) ∩ L dmg = ∅ 2. L(V A /G) − P −1 o P o (L(V /G)) ⊆ L dmg Σ * . is to some extent actually a weak attack goal, and then the attackability formulated in this paper corresponds to weak attackability. It is of interest to impose other conditions so that the synthesized supervisors can achieve strong attack goals and we need to formulate a notion of strong attackability correspondingly 23 . Intuitively, in strong attack, the attacker may disable attackable events that are enabled by the supervisors for two different purposes: 1) increase the chance that the attack will be successful, 2) increase the chances that the closed-loop system will execute a vulnerable string 24 that can be attacked.
Secondly, we assume that the attackers will not take risks in attacking the supervisors. This greatly limits the attack capability of the attackers. In many scenarios, it is useful to consider the synthesis of risky attackers. An example of a risky attack is to attack an attackable event when the attacker knows it is possible but is unsure whether a damaging string will be generated or not.
Thirdly, we impose in this work the assumption Σ c,A ⊆ Σ o,A and only consider the case of attacking normal supervisors. It is of interest to relax these two assumptions and study under what circumstances can supremal successful attackers be synthesized in general.
Finally, the main purpose for studying the synthesis of successful attackers is to synthesize resilient supervisor against actuator attackers. Thus, it is crucial to address the problem of synthesis of resilient supervisors, which is also left as a future work.
